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NORTH CAROLINA'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL
EXPANSION OF AN ANCIENT MAXIM:
USING DWI FATALITIES TO SATISFY
FIRST DEGREE FELONY-MURDER
"[Ilt is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free. It is not a much more serious wrong if a person is
convicted on a theory that does not even exist."1
INTRODUCTION
Drunk driving and the fatalities caused by driving under the
influence (hereinafter "DWI") have become a tremendous concern
in the United States.2 This heightened concern for the safety of
others has prompted the creation of statutes decreasing a state's
burden of proof in DWI convictions3 and increasing the severity of
punishment.4 North Carolina has been regarded as a leader in
1. Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d at 669 (9' Cir. 1993) (holding that
nonexistent theory of felony-murder during assault with a deadly weapon trial so
infected entire trial that resulting conviction violated due process).
2. See The Associated Press, Clinton Suggests Tougher Standard on Drunk
Driving, The Commercial Appeal, (Memphis, Tennessee), Dec. 27, 1998 at A-2;
See also Editorial, Seeks Higher Aiken Co. DUI Arrests, The Augusta Chronicle,
July 8, 1999 at A-4.
3. See Lee Davidson, Drunken-driving arrests plummet 40% in Utah, Desert
News, June 14, 1999 at A-2. (Stating that drunk driving arrest rates are higher
in states where drivers with just a 0.08 percent blood-alcohol level are considered
drunk-making arrest and conviction easier than where the standard is 0.10.);
See also M2 Presswire, Vice President Announces $57.4m in Incentive Grants to
17 States, with 0.08 BAC Laws, July 28, 1999, page unavailable online. Grants
are being awarded under provisions of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century (TEA-21), which authorizes more than $500 million in federal grants to
states over 6 years as incentives to enact and enforce laws that make it a drunk
driving offense per se to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or greater. The states receiving incentive grants
include: Alabama, $2.4 million; California, $13.5 million; Florida, $6.2 million;
Hawaii, $705,417; Idaho, $924,560; Illinois, $5.8 million; Kansas, $2.1 million;
Maine, $705,417; New Hampshire, $705,417; New Mexico, $1.1 million; North
Carolina, $3.5 million; Oregon, $1.9 million; Texas, $9.4 million; Utah, $1.1
million; Vermont, $705,417; Virginia, $3.1 million; and Washington, $2.7 million.
The District of Columbia will receive $705,417.
4. See Ledyard King, Laws on Lemons, Spam Among Several Hundred
Taking Effect Thursday, The Virginia-Pilot, June 29, 1999 at A-1. see also Mike
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the movement for stricter penalties5 and many of North Carolina's
drunk driving statutes are on the forefront in terms of
punishment.6
The greatest difference North Carolina has made regarding
DWI prosecutions involves the convictions in State v. Jones7 and
State v. Blackwell, 8 where both defendants were charged with and
found guilty of first degree felony-murder in accordance with G. S.
14-17. 9 Both defendants received a sentence of life in prison with-
out parole for their actions, 10 and as such they are the only indi-
viduals in the United States to be punished with such severity. 1
While North Carolina has positively contributed toward a decline
in DWI fatalities,' 2 the charges and convictions of Jones and
Blackwell are an over-expansion of the felony-murder rule. These
convictions violate the United States Constitution and contravene
the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly.' 3
This Comment begins with an overview of the facts and con-
victions in Jones and Blackwell, specifically the North Carolina
appellate decision to uphold Jones' conviction for felony-murder.
Section II will focus on the felony-murder rule, from historical
beginning to modern day application. In particular, North Caro-
lina's use of first degree felony-murder will be examined. Finally,
Wagner Drunken Driving; Bill Targets 'Hard-Core' Offenders, Dayton Daily
News, April 30, 1999 at 3-B. (Ohio lawmakers have passed legislation that
increases punishment on hard-core drunk drivers.'); See generally Editorial,
Smile for the camera, Globe and Mail, May 26 1998 A-18.
5. See Herman Clark, A Fix for Drunken Drivers: Interlock 'em Out, The
News & Observer (Raleigh, NC), May 13, 1998 page unavailable. (Stating that
North Carolina has one of the toughest DWI laws in the nation.) See generally
Christina Nifong, Even Stricter on Drunk Driving Congress Blocks Tougher
Drunk-Driving Law For Now. But State Efforts Gather Speed, Christian Science
Monitor, April 2, 1998 A-2.
6. Id. at A-2.
7. State v. Jones, 516 S.E.2d 405, 407 (N.C. App. 1999).
8. State v. Blackwell, 97 CRS 6391, Durham County, North Carolina (March
16, 1998).
9. See supra notes 7-8.
10. Id.
11. See infra note 293.
12. The percentage for alcohol fatalities has declined for years, in 1982 there
were 25, 165 alcohol-related fatalities and in 1995 there were 17,274 fatalities
attributable to alcohol. It is quite possible that North Carolina's strong
punishments for DWI's has been an important factor in this 16.2 % decrease in
alcohol fatalities. See Associated Press, Alcohol and Traffic Fatalities, USA
Today, May, 7, 1997 at A-3.
13. See infra section III and accompanying notes 197-220.
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Section III will explain the ramifications the Jones and Blackwell
verdicts have on felony-murder convictions. Specifically, Section
III explains how using DWI fatalities to satisfy felony-murder con-
victions is a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly.
This Comment argues that using a traffic fatality to satisfy
the felony-murder rule is inappropriate. When the State prose-
cutes a DWI fatality under the felony murder rule, it diminishes
the concept of an ancient doctrine. If it is the goal of the State to
give life sentences or the death penalty for DWI fatalities, then it
is the responsibility of the North Carolina General Assembly to
enact a statute specifically dictating such punishment rather than
the court judicially imposing the punishment through their inter-
pretation of the felony-murder rule.
I. JONES AND BLACKWELL: THE FACTS
A. State v. Jones
Thomas Richard Jones of Statesville, North Carolina, began
drinking at age 12.14 After having his leg amputated in a lawn
mower accident, Jones began using pain killers in combination
with alcohol.15 Jones would frequently drive after combining
drugs and alcohol and this behavior resulted in several convic-
tions for driving while intoxicated. 16 On the night of September 4,
1996, Jones had been drinking at two different bars17 and like
many nights in the past, Jones took his pain medication while
drinking alcohol before he began the drive home.'" As Jones drove
his truck down Polo road in Winston Salem, North Carolina, his
automobile crashed into a Mazda hatchback carrying several stu-
dents from Wake Forest University. 9 Although Jones received
14. Ann Sjoerdsma, Murder Conviction of Drunk Driver Sends Wrong
Message, We Need to Do More to Educate - Not Scare Ourselves, Parents and
Children About Alcoholism and Other Substance Abuse. We Need to Try Harder
to Intervene In Lives Before it's Too Late., Virginian Pilot and Ledger Star, May
26, 1997, at A2.
15. Id.
16. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 405.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 408.
19. Id.
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minor injuries, two of the passengers in the Mazda were killed,
specifically Mai Witz, age 19 and Julie Hanson, age 19.20
On the night of the accident Jones' blood alcohol level was
.046,21 almost half North Carolina's legal limit of .08.22 Still,
Jones was charged with driving while intoxicated.23 Under G. S.
20-138.1, North Carolina's drunk driving statute, if the State can
prove that an individual was sufficiently impaired as to be unfit to
drive an automobile then the State can obtain a conviction for
DWI even when a defendant's blood alcohol level is below the legal
limit.24 Thus, the use of pain killers in combination with the use
of alcohol was enough to render Jones unfit to drive an
automobile.2 5
Jones' DWI charge was elevated to habitual impaired driving
because Jones had received three prior DWI convictions within a
seven year period.2 6 Jones was also charged with assault with a
20. Associated Press, Hunt Signs Tougher Drunken Driving Bill, Greensboro
News and Record, Aug. 8, 1997, at A2.
21. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 408.
22. State v. Crawford, 125 N.C. App. 279, 480 S.E.2d 422 (1999) (Holding that
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a) (1993) to be guilty of driving while impaired,
a person must drive a vehicle upon a highway, street, or public vehicular area
within this State while under the influence of an impairing substance or after
having consumed sufficient alcohol to have a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or
more at any relevant time after driving.).
23. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 408.
24. See State v. Harrington, 78 N.C. App. 39, 336 S.E.2d 852 (1985). (Holding
that under N.C. Gen Stat. § 20-138.1 the State may prove that defendant was
driving while impaired where defendant's blood alcohol content is entirely
unknown or less than 0.10.); See also State v. Sigmon, 74 N.C. App. 479 (1985)
(The court held that a blood alcohol content of 0.06 did not create the
presumption that a defendant was not impaired and thus the court affirmed the
conviction based on the opinion of the arresting officer.).
25. See supra note 21 at 405 (Also found in Jones' blood were several
substances which have an effect of impairing an individual. Jones' blood
specimen contained Barbiturates, Benzodiazepine, and Oxycodone. The
barbiturate derivative detected was Butalbital. Butalbital causes drowsiness,
sedation, and ataxia. Alpraxolam (Xanax) is a benzodiazepine which is effective
at very low doses. Common side effects of Xanax include drowsiness and fatigue.
Oxycodone is a DEA Schedule II controlled semi-synthetic narcotic. Oxycodone
is used to control pain associated with injuries. Andrew Mason, Ph.D. a forensic
Toxicologist, tested the specimen and stated with reasonable scientific certainty
the subject's alertness, judgment, perception, coordination, and response time
and sense of care and caution were impaired to and beyond the point of rendering
him unfit to operate a motor vehicle safely.).
26. See State v. Ellis, 130 N.C. App. 596, 504 S.E.2d 787 (1998) (citing N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-138.5(a) (1995 & Supp. 1998) which states that "A person
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deadly weapon inflicting serious injury for each passenger who
survived the accident." For the death of Megan and Mai, the two
Wake Forest students, Jones was charged with felony-murder
under North Carolina's first degree murder statute, G. S. 14-17.28
On May 7, 1997, a jury found Jones guilty on both counts of fel-
ony-murder.2 9 Jones received two consecutive life sentences with-
out parole,3" becoming the first individual in the United States to
be convicted of first degree felony-murder arising out of a DWI
fatality.3 ' Jones' conviction at trial was only the beginning. On
June 15, 1999, the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the
trial verdict in Jones in a two to one decision. 32
In Jones, the majority opinion began with an analysis of
North Carolina's first degree felony-murder statute, G. S. 14-17.11
Specifically, the elements of assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury, the underlying felony, was the focus of
the majority opinion. 4 The court defined assault as "an overt act
or attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with
force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to
another person."35 A deadly weapon was defined by the court as
any "article, instrument or substance which is likely to produce
commits the offense of habitual impaired driving if he drives while impaired and
has been convicted of three or more offenses involving impaired driving within
seven years of the date of the current offense."); See generally, Editorials,
Tougher DWI Should Save Lives, Too Many Repeat Offenders Are Allowed To
Remain Behind The Wheel, Greensboro News and Record, Aug. 2, 1997, at A3.
27. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 405.
28. Id. at 406; See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1995) stating that a homicide
.committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape, or
sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or
attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed murder in the first
degree."
29. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 406; See also Amanda Garett and Dan Kane, Jury
Finds Blackwell Guilty of Murder in DWI Case, Greensboro News and Record,
April 17, 1998, at A2.
30. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 407.
31. Sjoerdsma, supra note 14.
32. Id.
33. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 405.
34. Id. at 407 (The Court defines assault with a deadly weapon as (1) An
assault; (2) with a deadly weapon; (3) inflicting serious injury; and (4) not
resulting in death. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32(b) (1993)).
35. Id. (citing State v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303, 305
(1967)).
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death or great bodily harm."36 The court in Jones explained that
an automobile which is driven in a dangerous manner can be a
deadly weapon 37 and that a "driver who operates an automobile in
such a manner that it is a deadly weapon can be convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury if the driver
... commits a culpably or criminally negligent act from which
such intent may be implied."38 Culpable criminal negligence may
be satisfied by "the violation of a safety statute which results in
injury or death."39 With this analysis, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that Jones' actions clearly satisfied a conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.4" By find-
ing a valid conviction for the underlying felony, the court held that
when applied to the language of North Carolina's first-degree fel-
ony-murder statute, Jones' actions also supported a conviction for
felony-murder.4 1
Jones was the first case in the United States where first
degree murder was charged in a traffic fatality. However, the
Jones verdict is not an isolated case. Soon thereafter, North Caro-
lina used a DWI fatality to satisfy first degree felony-murder in
the case of State v. Blackwell.42
B. State v. Blackwell
On the morning of March 6, 1997, Timothy Earl Blackwell of
Durham County, North Carolina, was unexpectedly called into
work after a night of drinking alcohol and little sleep. Blackwell
soon left the job site to consume more alcohol.44 While driving
down Guess Road in Durham, North Carolina, a truck driver
noticed Blackwell's inability to stay in his own lane of traffic.45
36. Id. (citing State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111, 120, 340 S.E.2d 465, 470 (1986)
(quoting State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 301, 283 S.E.2d 719, 725 (1981)).
37. Id. (citing State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 755, 114 S.E. 828, 829-30
(1922)).
38. Id. (citing State v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 65, 86 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1955)).
39. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 407 (citing State v. Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 435, 103
S.E.2d 491, 494 (1958)).
40. Id. at 409.
41. Id.
42. State v. Blackwell, 97 CRS 6391, Durham County, North Carolina (March
16, 1998)
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.
45. Paul Bonner, This Guy's Going to Kill Somebody, Durham Herald Sun,
March 6, 1997, at A10. Tom Pruitt was driving directly behind Timothy
[Vol. 22:169174
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The truck driver quickly contacted the City of Durham police dis-
patch,46 but officers were unable to intercept Blackwell until after
he had collided with two automobiles.47
The first automobile Blackwell hit was driven by Sherry
Dail.48 After impact, Blackwell's truck then continued past Mrs.
Dail's automobile until it collided with the car directly behind
Mrs. Dail, a car driven by her husband Gregory Dail.49 The Dail's
three children Megan, age four, Austin, age two, and Joshua, age
one were inside Mr. Dail's automobile.5" Although Mrs. Dail and
her husband received only minor injuries as a result of the acci-
dent,51 two of the Dail children received more severe injuries and
Megan, the oldest child, was killed.52
Blackwell was charged with DW153 for driving a vehicle with
a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.5 4 Like Jones, Blackwell's
DWI charge was elevated to habitual impaired driving for having
three prior DWI convictions within a seven year period.
Blackwell when he saw Blackwell cross over the center lane and strike a
mailbox. Blackwell then swerved back into his proper lane and continued to
weave his automobile as he proceeded toward the Durham city limits.
46. Id. Pruitt used his cellular phone to contact police dispatch after seeing
Timothy Blackwell cross the center line of the road.
47. Id. Because Blackwell crossed into county jurisdiction while driving down
Guess Road, Pruitt's call was subsequently transferred from city police to county
police. This switch took approximately two minutes.
48. Amanda Garett, Medical Testimony Offered, The News and Observer,
Raleigh, North Carolina, April 2, 1998 at B4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Joshua and Austin received lacerations to the head while Megan's
spinal column was severed at the base of the neck. Medical testimony was
offered that were it not for quick resuscitation by Megan's parents the child
would have been pronounced dead at the scene of the accident.
53. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 (1995).
54. State v. Blackwell, 97 CRS 6391, Durham County, North Carolina (March
16, 1998) (Also found in Blackwell's blood alcohol were substances similar to
Jones which have the effect of impairing one's ability to drive); See also
Associated Press, Verdict: 1St-Degree Murder In DWI Case Timothy Blackwell
Was Found Guilty and Now Faces a Life Sentence After Driving Drunk and
Killing a 4-Year-Old, Orlando Sentinel, April 17, 1998 at A9.
55. See State v. Blackwell, 97 CRS 4860, Durham County, North Carolina
(Feb. 23, 1996); State v. Blackwell, 93 CRS 4801, Durham County, North
Carolina (Feb. 22, 1996); State v. Blackwell, 93 CR 5214, Durham County, North
Carolina (Dec. 23, 1993); State v. Blackwell, 93 CR 287,88, Durham County,
North Carolina (Dec. 31, 1992); State v. Blackwell, 92 CR 10248, Durham
County, North Carolina (April 17, 1992) (each resulting in a DWI conviction).
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Blackwell was charged with four counts of assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury for the injuries sustained by the
living members of the Dail family.5 6 For the death of Megan Dail,
Blackwell was charged with first-degree felony-murder.57
On April 16, 1998, a jury found Blackwell guilty of habitual
DWI, one charge of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury, and felony-murder.58 Blackwell became the second indi-
vidual in the United States to receive a mandatory life sentence
without the possibility of parole for a DWI fatality, approximately
one year after the sentencing in the Jones case.59 Currently,
Blackwell's case is pending review by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals.6 °
Factually, Jones and Blackwell are almost identical. Jones
and Blackwell both received multiple convictions for driving while
intoxicated and their consumption of prescription drugs and alco-
hol while attempting to drive resulted in a traffic accident where
someone else was killed. At trial, both defendants were convicted
of felony-murder where the underlying felony of assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury was satisfied by the use of
a motor vehicle. With little difference in the facts and charges, the
appellate decision in Blackwell will likely be the same as that in
Jones. The verdicts in Jones and Blackwell are cases of first
impression in North Carolina as well as in the entire United
States. As the North Carolina Supreme Court reviews the valid-
ity of these decisions, a proper examination of the history of the
felony-murder rule must be undertaken. Specifically, the history
and application of the felony-murder rule in North Carolina must
be examined to determine the constitutionality of the convictions
and subsequent sentences in Jones and Blackwell.
56. See also Associated Press, Verdict: 1t-Degree Murder In DWI Case
Timothy Blackwell Was Found Guilty and Now Faces a Life Sentence After
Driving Drunk and Killing a 4-Year-Old, Orlando Sentinel, April 17, 1998 at A9.
57. Id.
58. State v. Blackwell, 97 CRS 6391, Durham County, North Carolina (March
16, 1998); See also Associated Press, Verdict: 1 t -Degree Murder In DWI Case
Timothy Blackwell Was Found Guilty and Now Faces a Life Sentence After
Driving Drunk and Killing a 4-Year-Old, Orlando Sentinel, April 17, 1998 at A9.
59. See Associated Press, Verdict: lt-Degree Murder In DWI Case Timothy
Blackwell Was Found Guilty and Now Faces a Life Sentence After Driving Drunk
and Killing a 4-Year-Old, Orlando Sentinel, April 17, 1998 at A9.
60. Id.
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II. FELONY-MURDER: AN OVERVIEW
The felony-murder rule states that if a death results in the
course or commission or attempted commission of a felony, the
defendant is guilty of homicide.61 The felony-murder rule holds
those who commit the most severe felonies responsible for the
death of an individual as if the death was an intended act of the
defendant.62 The definition and application of the felony-murder
rule has changed very little from its ancient roots in the English
common law. Yet, the beginnings of this rule are on the fringe of
legal jurisprudence.6 3 Many states have reduced the scope of this
ancient doctrine because the felony-murder rule may have been
improperly created.64 North Carolina, like the majority of the
states in the U.S. has been a part of this movement. 65 However,
Jones and Blackwell may represent a judicial trend toward
increasing the scope of the felony-murder rule.66 With this expan-
sion comes criticism, forcing those in favor of the felony-murder
rule to find additional reasons for its continued use.6 7
A. History of Felony-Murder
The felony-murder rule has been traced to the 16 th century
case of Lord Dacres .6 8 Lord Dacres involved the death of a
gamekeeper by unlawful hunters. 69 Lord Dacres and his compan-
ions agreed to enter into a park, without permission, to hunt and
to kill anyone who opposed their hunting.70 While in the park,
one of Lord Dacres companions killed a gamekeeper. 7' Even
61. Wayne R. Lafave and Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law § 7 (Student ed. 2nd.
1986).
62. See State v. Casper, 219 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 1974).
63. See infra note 86. The early form of the felony-murder rule probably went
unchallenged because during the 18' century virtually all felonies were
punishable by death.
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 99-105. Today North Carolina's felony-murder rule can
only be satisfied with the use of rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, arson, or
any felony committed with the use of a deadly weapon.
66. Jones and Blackwell are cases of first impression in the United States.
67. See infra notes 133-136. The justifications for the continued existence of
the felony-murder rule include deterrence, retribution, transferred intent, and
prosecutorial efficiency.
68. Lord Dacres, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535). See George P. Fletcher,
Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. Rev. 413 (1981).
69. Dacres at 458.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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though Lord Dacres was not present when the killing occurred, he,
along with his companions, was convicted of murder and was sub-
sequently hanged.72 While this case has been recognized as the
first use of the felony-murder rule, the case actually has little if
anything to do with the concept.73 Indeed, it has been stated that
"[tihe holding was not that Lord Dacres and his companions were
guilty of murder because they had joined in an unlawful [act] in
the course of which a person was killed, but rather that those not
present physically at the killing were held liable as principles on a
theory of constructive presence."74
A second case cited as a foundation for the felony-murder rule
is Mansell & Herbert's case.75 Mansell involved the death of an
unarmed woman, who was an innocent bystander during a quar-
rel between Herbert and Mansell.76 Specifically, Herbert and a
large group of followers went to Sir Mansfield's house to seize
goods that Herbert lawfully owned.77 At Sir Mansell's home, one
of Herbert's servants intentionally threw a stone at one person,
but accidentally hit a woman who was coming out of Mansell's
house. 78 The innocent woman later died from head injuries result-
ing from the stone throw. 79 Like Lord Dacres, Herbert received
the death penalty. The majority held that if one deliberately per-
formed an act of violence to third parties, and a person uninten-
tionally hurt died, it was murder regardless of any mistake or
misapplication of force.80 Again, this case can not be used to jus-
tify the felony-murder rule. Mansell involved a deliberate act of
72. Id.
73. People of Michigan v. Aaron, 299 N.W. 2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980).
74. Id.
75. Mansell, 73 Eng.Rep. 279 (KB 1558). See generally James J. Tomkovicz,
The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our
Criminal Law, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1429 (1994); Michael J. Roman, "Once
More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends, Once More" : A Call to Re-Evaluate the
Felony-Murder Doctrine in the Wake of State v. Oimen and State v. Rivera, 77
Marq. L. Rev. 785 (1985); and Larry Kramer, Jurisdiction Over Interstate Felony
Murder, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1431 (1983).
76. See generally James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder
Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1429 (1994).
77. Tomkovicz, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 1442.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See J. M. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter, Part II,
83 L.Quarterly Rev. 569, 578-579, 593 (1967); see also, King v. Borthwick, 1
Doug. 207, 212; 99 Eng.Rep. 136, 138-139 (KB, 1779).
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violence against a person which resulted in an unintended person
being the recipient of a violent act, not an unintended death in the
commission of a felony.81
Sir Edward Coke, often considered the greatest jurist of the
seventeenth century,82 served as the Attorney General of England
for twelve years.83 During his period of service, Coke used Dacres
and Mansell as the basis for his decree regarding the felony-mur-
der rule.84 Despite a lack of authority Coke's decree has evolved
into common law felony-murder.85 Perhaps Coke's early form of
the felony-murder rule went unchallenged because virtually all
felonies were punishable by death in the 1 8th century.8 6
As case law evolved into the Nineteenth Century, English
courts began to limit the use of the felony-murder rule87 and in
1957, England abolished the felony-murder rule altogether.88 Yet,
the abolishment of the felony-murder rule had no effect on the
81. See Kaye, 83 L. Quarterly Rev. at 578 (Noting that the throwing of the
stone was not a careless act because the servant who threw the stone intended to
hit at least, if not kill some person on Mansfield's side.).
82. See Brian P. Levack, Possession, Witchcraft, and the Law in Jacobean
England, 52 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1613 (1995).
83. See Edward Foss, A Biographical Dictionary of the Judges of England
from the Conquest to the Present Time 1066-1870, at 178 (London, John Murray
1870).
84. Coke, Third Institutes at 56 (1797) (stating that"[i]f the act be unlawful it
is murder. As if A meaning to steale a deere in the park of B, shooteth at the
deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush: this is
murder, for that the act was unlawful, although A had no intent to hurt the boy,
nor new not of him. But if B the owner of the park had shot at his own deer, and
without any ill intent had killed the boy by the glance of his arrow, this had been
homicide by misadventure and no felony. So if one shoot at any wild fowle upon a
tree and the arrow killeth any reasonable creature afar off, without any evil
intent in him, this is per infortuniam (misadventure): for it was not unlawful to
shoot at the wilde fowle: but if he had shot at a cock or hen, or any tame fowle of
another mans, and the arrow by mischance had killed the man, this had been
murder, for the act was unlawful.").
85. 3 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England at 58 (London,
Macmillan, 1883) (stating "[t]his is not distinguished by any statute but is the
common law only of Sir Edward Coke.").
86. See Rollin M. Perkins, A Reexamination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale
L. J. 537, 542-543 (1934).
87. Sidney Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the
Law of Murder, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 624, 635 (1957).
88. Section 1 of England's Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c.11, § 1. The act
states that "a killing occurring in a felony-murder situation will not amount to
murder unless done with the same malice aforethought as is for all other
murder." Id.
11
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United States who borrowed the felony-murder rule from England
in 1776.9
In the United States, only four states have abolished the fel-
ony-murder rule. Those states are Hawaii,90 Kentucky,9 1 Ohio,92
and Michigan. 93 All states though have limited the rule in some
form. The Model Penal code lists several generalized limitations
imposed by American courts on the use of the felony-murder
rule.94 Indeed, courts have noted that "[tihe modifications and
89. See generally, People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 903-04 (Cal. 1984).
90. In Hawaii's murder statute, Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 707-701 (1998), the
commentary speaks of why Hawaii abolished felony murder. It states;
Even in its limited formulation of the felony-murder rule [it] is still
objectionable. It is not sound principle to convert an accidental,
negligent, or reckless homicide into a murder simply because, without
more, the killing was in furtherance of a criminal objective of some
defined class. In recognition of the trend toward, and the substantial
body of criticism supporting the abolition of the felony-murder rule, and
because of the extremely questionable results which the rule has worked
in other jurisdictions, the Code has eliminated from our law the felony-
murder rule.
91. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507.020 (1998).
92. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.04 (1999). The code states that
"[mianslaughter by definition does not require malice. As the primary purpose of
the felony-murder rule is to supply malice from the underlying felony, the rule
has no usefulness as such in Ohio." Id.
93. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980) (Stating that "[w]hatever
reasons can be gleaned from the dubious origin of the felony-murder rule to
explain its existence, those reasons no longer exist today. Today we exercise our
role in the development of common-law by abrogating the common-law felony-
murder rule.").
94. The first limitation to felony-murder is that the felonious act must be
dangerous to human life. See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d 262 (Pa.
1967); Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967); State v. Moffitt, 431 P.2d 879
(Kan. 1967), overruled by State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 (Kan. 1980); and
People v. Pavlic, 199 N.W. 373 (Mich. 1978). Second, the homicide must be a
natural and probable consequence of the felonious act. See State v. Glover, 50
S.W.2d 1049 (Mo. 1932); People v. Scott 185 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. App. 1971); and
State v. Muldin, 529 P.2d 124 (Kan. 1974). Third, the felony must be malum in
se, meaning a wrong in itself; an act or case involving the illegality from the very
nature of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public law.
State v. Shedoudy, 118 P.2d 280, 287 (N.M. 1941); and Ginderstaffv. State, 377
S.W.2d 921, 926 (Tenn. 1964). An act is said to be malum in se when it is
inherently and essentially evil, that is, immoral in its nature and injurious in its
consequence, without any regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by
the law of the state. Such are most of the offenses cognizable at common law
(without denouncement of a statute). Fourth, the act must be a common-law
felony. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Exler, 89 A. 968 (Pa. 1914); and State v.
12
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restrictions upon the common law felony-murder doctrine . . .
reflect a dissatisfaction with the harshness and injustice of the
rule."95 While the felony-murder rule continues to exist in most
states, it has become less like the common law concept.9 6 Most
states have placed stringent limitations on the scope and impor-
tance of the felony-murder rule, which suggests that felony-mur-
der may have no purpose in the United States.97
North Carolina used the common law form of the felony-mur-
der rule for more than a hundred years.9" In 1893, the General
Assembly of North Carolina codified common law felony-murder
into statutory felony-murder.9 9 In State v. Thompson, 1°° the
North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the statute nar-
rowly,1 °1 holding it only applied to homicides that occurred during
the commission of one of several enumerated felonies. 10 2 The enu-
merated felonies included arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and felo-
nies creating a "substantial foreseeable human risk and actually
Burrell, 199 A.2d 18 (N.J. Err. App. 1928). Fifth, the period during which the
felony is in the process of commission must be narrowly construed. See e.g.
People v. Archie Smith, 222 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. App. 1974); People v. Walsh, 186
N.E. 422 (N.Y. 1933) overruled in part by People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y.
1961); and State v. Taylor, 139 So. 463 (La. 1931). Lastly, the underlying felony
must be independent of the homicide. See e.g. State v. Garrett, 573 S.W.2d 543
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
95. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316 (Mich. 1980).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. State v. Covington, 117 N.C. 834, 865, 23 S.E. 337, 353 (1895) Under
North Carolina's common-law form of felony-murder, a killing committed in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony constituted murder.
99. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 76, 76-77 (In 1893,
the General Assembly divided murder into two degrees, felony-murder was
placed in the first degree and was then treated as premeditated murder for
punishment purposes.); See State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 422, 290 S.E.2d 574,
588 (1982); State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 305, 56 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1949);
(Under common law, murder was not classified in degrees, rather all killings
with malice aforethought were treated as murder). After the 1893 statute was
created, first-degree murder was used to single out the more atrocious killings.
See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 76, 76-77 (1893) (codified
as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-17 (Supp.1997)); Murder in the first degree
was punishable by death while murder in the second degree was punishable by
imprisonment. See State v. Dalton, 178 N.C. 779, 783, 101 S.E. 548, 549-550
(1919).
100. State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
101. Id. at 671.
102. Id.
13
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resulting in the loss of life."' °3 In 1977, the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly further limited the scope of the felony-murder rule
by amending G. S. 14-17.104 In the 1977 amendments, kidnapping
was added to the list of enumerated felonies and the broad cate-
gory of felonies creating a "substantial foreseeable human risk
and actually resulting in the loss of life" was replaced with "felo-
nies committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon."' °5
North Carolina, like the majority of states, has continually
limited the felony-murder rule by statute;10 6 however, Jones and
Blackwell show that North Carolina is far from abolishing the fel-
ony-murder rule. In fact, the convictions of Jones and Blackwell
have actually expanded the use of felony-murder, specifically in
the area of DWI fatalities.0 7 Arguably, this expansion is beyond
the scope of North Carolina's felony-murder statute. Proper inter-
pretation of G.S.14-17 should give the North Carolina Supreme
Court a viable reason to limit the scope of first-degree felony-mur-
der. The North Carolina Supreme Court should limit the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of the scope of G.S. 14-17 by holding that a
traffic fatality when prosecuted as assault with a deadly weapon
cannot satisfy the elements of the felony-murder rule.
B. Felony-Murder: The Elements
The elements of most crimes are divided into two categories,
mens rea and actus reas.'0 8 Mens rea is the mental requirement
necessary for the commission of the crime, generally stated as the
"intent" requirement. 10 9 Actus reas is the wrongful act or "action"
103. State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 408, 226 S.E.2d 652, 699 (1976) (Swift lists
several felonies that are considered inherently dangerous to life, this list includes
breaking, entering, and larceny; robbery; escape from prison; kidnapping; and
arson.). This inferred limitation ensured that murder liability could attach only
to sufficiently violent acts involving the potential for loss of life. See also Erwin
S. Barbre, Annotation, What Felonies are Inherently Dangerous to Human Life
for Purposes of Felony-Murder Doctrine, 50 A.L.R.3d 397 (1973) (giving an
overview of the various felonies which are inherently dangerous to human life in
the context of felony-murder).
104. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 409.
105. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407 (codified as
amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1986)).
106. See supra note 88-90.
107. See infra section III and accompanying notes.
108. Wayne R. Lafave and Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law, § 6.7 at 586 ( 2 nd ed.
1986).
109. Id.
[Vol. 22:169
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss1/6
DWIYFELONY-MURDER
necessary for the criminal commission.110 Certain crimes require
that a specific result accompany the mens rea and actus reas and
when a specific result is necessary, the state prosecutor must also
show causation."1 These general principles do not apply to the
felony-murder rule. Because felony-murder statutes may vary
from state to state, the explanation of the elements of the felony-
murder rule will focus on the common law form of felony-murder.
In particular, North Carolina's use of common law felony-murder
will be emphasized.
Common law felony-murder states that if a death results in
the course or commission or attempted commission of a felony, a
defendant is guilty of homicide." 2 Unlike other crimes dealing
with homicide, there is no mens rea requirement for the resulting
death. 1 13 The only required mens rea for felony-murder comes
from the underlying felony. 114 However, to accomplish this trans-
fer of intent there must exist a causal relationship between the
homicide and the underlying felony.1 1 5 This causal relationship is
usually satisfied by a finding that death was a foreseeable result
of the underlying felony." 6 Simply put, if an individual intends to
commit a felonious act, conscious of the inherent risk of death to
another, he will be held responsible under the felony-murder rule
for a resulting death as if he intended the death.11
7
In North Carolina, the felony-murder rule functions like com-
mon law felony-murder by transferring the intent from the under-
lying felony to the murder charge; however, North Carolina has
limited the felonies which may be used to base the murder convic-
tion on,"" which are rape, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary
or any felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly
weapon."19
110. Id.
111. Id. As an example, in crimes that require the death of an individual, the
district attorney must also show that the defendant's actions are the cause of the
homicide.
112. Id.
113. See Lafave and Scott, Criminal Law at 586.
114. See generally United States v. Kayarath, 962 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 (D. Ka.
1997).
115. See State v. Price, 344 N.C. 583, 588 (1996).
116. Id. See generally State v. Casper, 219 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 1974); See also
State v. Amaro, 436 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
117. Id.
118. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 409.
119. Id.
1999]
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A final aspect of the felony-murder rule typically not codified
in felony-murder statutes, is the merger doctrine. 120 The merger
doctrine limits the charges that an individual can be sentenced for
under a felony-murder conviction. 121  In its application, the
merger doctrine prevents the state from giving an additional sen-
tence for the underlying felony being used to satisfy the felony-
murder conviction. 122 To illustrate, an individual who robs a bank
and kills someone in the process of the robbery, if convicted of fel-
ony-murder, will not receive a separate sentence for the
robbery. 123
A second variation of the merger doctrine applies to Jones and
Blackwell under the prohibition against double jeopardy. 124
Double jeopardy forbids twice charging or convicting an individual
for the same offense. 125 When Jones and Blackwell were charged
with felony-murder, the State could not charge them with assault
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury for the death of
each passenger killed. The assault upon the deceased victim
merged into the felony-murder charge. If the State charged Jones
or Blackwell with assault with a deadly weapon for each of the
victims who died, it would have violated the rule against double
jeopardy. 126 Applying double jeopardy to Jones and Blackwell,
the assault on each of the deceased victims merged into the felony-
murder charge. This is an important concept that directly effects
the reckless motorist. For the reckless motorist, there must be a
passenger in the victim's car for the state to attempt a felony-mur-
der conviction. If there is no passenger in the deceased victim's
car, there cannot be a separate assault with a deadly weapon
120. In North Carolina the state may not punish both for the underlying felony
which constitutes an essential element and the felony-murder. See State v.
Martin, 309 N.C. 465, 308 S.E.2d 277 (1983); and State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67,
199 S.E.2d 409 (1973); State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
This result has been referred to as the "merger rule." See State v. Silhan, 302
N.C. 223, 262-63, 275 S.E.2d 450, 478 (1981); State v. Jeffiies, 55 N.C.App. 269,
290, 285 S.E.2d 307, 320 (1982).
121. State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 262-63, 275 S.E.2d 450, 478 (1981).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See generally State v. Lea, 126 N.C. App. 440, 485 S.E.2d. 874 (1997).
125. Id.
126. See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (holding that when one
defendant was convicted of felony murder based on his co-defendant's killing in
the course of an armed robbery, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment barred a separate prosecution of the defendant for the lesser crime
of armed robbery).
[Vol. 22:169
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charge. Without a separate assault to base the felony-murder on,
second degree murder is the highest conviction the State can seek,
no matter how egregious the death. 127 This appears disproportion-
ate. Such disproportionality is an example of the criticism that
surrounds the continued existence of the felony-murder rule. As
the debate over the use of the felony-murder rule continues to
flourish, 128 proponents of the rule are forced to find satisfactory
legal justifications for a very old criminal doctrine.
C. Rationale for the Felony-Murder Rule
Proponents of the felony-murder rule have espoused several
justifications for its continued use. These justifications include
retribution,' 2 9  deterrence, 3 °  transferred intent,' 3 ' and
prosecutorial efficiency.' 32 While each justification seems valid, a
closer examination illustrates the inherent flaws surrounding
each rationale.
1. Retribution
Retribution, as a rationale for the felony-murder rule, means
that when death is the result of a felonious criminal act that act
should be punished more severely. 133 This justification focuses on
127. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 423.
128. See generally Brian D. Roark, State v. Lea: Attempt Plus Felony-Murder
Does Not Equal Attempted Felony Murder, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 2360 (1998); see also,
James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 Wash. & Lee L Rev. 1429 (1994).
129. See generally Brian D. Roark, State v. Lea: Attempt Plus Felony-Murder
Does Not Equal Attempted Felony Murder, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 2360 (1998).
130. See generally James J. Tomkowicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder
Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1429, 1432 (1994).
131. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986) (stating that the
mens rea, or intent is transferred from the underlying felony and stating that
[als a result of the fictional transfer, the homicide is deemed committed with
malice").
132. See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law, 467-477 (1987).
133. See David Crump & Susan Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder
Doctrine, 8 Harv. J. Law & Pub.Pol'y 359, at 367-368 (1985) (This article states
that "[r]eaffirming the sanctity of human life" and showing "an expression of
solidarity with the victims of the crime" are retributive reasons for the felony
murder rule); See generally, Michael S. Simon, Whose Crime Is It Anyway?:
Liability For The Lethal Acts Of Nonparticipants In The Felony, 71 U. Det. Mercy
L. Rev. 223, 230 (1994).
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the severity of the resulting harm, 134 not on the criminal's
intent. 135 However, this rationale is not without criticism because
North Carolina punishes felony-murder in the same way it pun-
ishes premeditated murder. 136 By statute a conviction for pre-
meditated murder or felony-murder must result in a sentence of
life in prison without the possibility of parole or a sentence of
death by lethal injection.' 31 In North Carolina, the punishments
are the same despite the fact that premeditated murder is funda-
mentally worse than felony-murder. Indeed, premeditated murder
requires the conscious reflection to kill another. 13  While felony-
murder can be satisfied by mere reckless behavior resulting in
death. 139
2. Deterrence
Deterrence is a second justification for the existence of the fel-
ony-murder rule.' 40 First, proponents argue that the felony-mur-
der rule may deter killings that would occur during the
commission of an underlying felony.14 1 These proponents believe
134. State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W. 2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1980). See also Wayne R.
LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law at 640; and William Michael
Beasley and Joe Price Coleman, Constitutional Limits Upon the Use of Statutory
Presumptions and the Felony-Murder Rule, 46 Miss. L. J. 1021, 1038 (1975).
135. William Michael Beasley and Joe Price Coleman, Constitutional Limits
Upon the Use of Statutory Presumptions and the Felony-Murder Rule, 46 Miss. L.
J. 1021, 1038 (1975).
136. State v. Williams, 350 NC 1, 510 S.E.2d 626 (1999) (felony murder
conviction led to life sentence). See also State v. DeCastro, 342 NC 667, 467
S.E.2d 653 (1996) (felony murder conviction led to life sentence). But see State v.
White, 509 S.E.2d 462, 464 (1998) (premeditated murder conviction resulted in
life sentence without parole); and State v. Anderson, 513 S.E.2d 296 (1999)
(holding that a "death sentence was not disproportionate... under premeditated
murder [or] felony-murder").
137. See Anderson, 513 S.E.2d at 296 ( holding that a "death sentence was not
disproportionate ... under premeditated murder [or] felony-murder").
138. See generally State v. Thomas, 332 NC 554, 560, 423 S.E.2d 75, 84 (1992).
139. See generally State v. Richmond, 347 NC 412, 495 S.E.2d 677 (1998).
140. See Brian D. Roark, State v. Lea: Attempt Plus Felony-Murder Does Not
Equal Attempted Felony Murder, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 2360, 2364 (1998) (citing
United States v. Martinez, 16 F.3d 202, 207 (7' Cir. 1994))(holding that "liability
for felony murder serves the practical function of deterring felons from using
lethal weaponry, more broadly from committing the kind of felony in which
someone is likely to be injured").
141. The felonies are those specifically listed in a state's felony-murder statute.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Supp. 1998). In North Carolina, these felonies
include arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, and burglary.
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that criminals may be more likely to avoid such killings because of
the strong penalties for deaths which occur during statutorily enu-
merated felonies. 142 This justification is misguided in that it is
impossible to deter a killing that was never intentionally commit-
ted. 143  Specifically looking at DWI fatalities, the inebriated
defendant may have intended to drink and drive, but not to take
the life of another.1 4 4
A second effect of deterrence put forth in defense of the felony-
murder rule is that the individual contemplating the commission
of a felony may decide the gain from committing the felony is not
worth the risk of the death penalty. 45 This would not only avoid
accidental killings, but would also deter the specific felony associ-
ated with the unintentional death. Take for example a crime such
as rape. If an assailant commits the offense of rape and the victim
subsequently dies, the assailant can receive the death penalty
under the felony-murder rule. The deterrence theory is that the
possibility of the death penalty will hopefully deter the killing of
the victim and may also deter the actual rape. However, few
felons have any concept of the felony-murder rule,146 and certainly
most do not understand the level of punishment they could receive
if a death resulted from their commission of the underlying fel-
ony.' 47 For Mr. Jones and Mr. Blackwell, it may have been their
intent to drink and drive, but it is unlikely they intended to com-
mit an assault with a deadly weapon that would inflict serious
142. See Nelson Roth & Scott Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 446, 452 (1985). See also Joshua
Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 464 (1987); See Jonathan K. Van Patrick,
Merger and the Felony-Murder Rule, 20 UCLA L. Rev. 250, 258-259 (1972).
143. See Nelson Roth & Scott Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 446, 452 (1985).
144. See generally Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) and State v. Gaines,
345 N.C 647, 483 S.E.2d 396 (1997).
145. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 307.
146. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799-800 nn. 23-24 (citing that there is no statistical
evidence which tends to show that the felony-murder rule has any deterrent
effect on would be criminals).
147. See generally James J. Tomkovitz, The Endurance of the Felony Murder
Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1429, 1448-58 (1994). See also Philip D. Zelikow, The Constitutionality of
Imposing The Death Penalty for Felony-Murder, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 356, 376-378
(1978); and Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799-800 nn 23-24 (1982) (citing that there is no
statistical evidence which tends to show that the felony murder rule has any
deterrent effect on would be criminals).
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injury or kill another person. Arguably, few individuals would see
a connection between a DWI and first degree murder.
3. Transferred Intent
Transferred intent is another justification for the felony-mur-
der rule.'48 Transferred intent means that the individual accused
of felony-murder need not intend the death of a person. 14 9
Instead, the individual must intend only to commit the underlying
felony. 5 ' The intent to commit the felony is then transferred to
satisfy the mens rea required for a murder conviction.15 1 By
transferring the intent, the felony-murder rule holds those who
commit felonies to a higher degree of responsibility.'5 2
This justification may appear valid, but it is unjust to use
transferred intent to support the continued use of felony-murder.
In Jones and Blackwell, the mens rea is twice removed. Both
Jones and Blackwell intended to drink and drive.' 53 Because their
actions were reckless, their behavior satisfied the mens rea for the
assault with a deadly weapon charge.' Once the State has an
underlying felony, here assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury, the State may then borrow the underlying mens
rea for the underlying felony to satisfy the mens rea for a homicide
conviction. The mens rea for a DWI felony-murder is double boot-
strapped, from drinking and driving to assault with a deadly
weapon, then from assault with a deadly weapon to a felony-mur-
der conviction.
148. See W. J. Roarty, An Assault Resulting in Homicide May be Used to Invoke
the Felony-Murder Rule, 13 Gonz. L. Rev. 268, 271 (1977); and State v. Carson,
337 N.C. 407, 445 S.E.2d 585 (1994).
149. Roarty, 13 Gonz. L. Rev. at 271.
150. Id.
151. See 2 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence at 215 (3d
ed. 1988); and State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 407; 226 S.E.2d 652, 669 (1976)
(felony murder rule makes premeditation and deliberation immaterial). See
generally, Lewis v. U.S., 523 U.S. 155 (1998); and Flanders v. Meacham, 13 F.3d
600, 605 (2d Cir. 1994).
152. Id.
153. See 2 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence at 215 (3d
ed. 1988).
154. Jones at 407. The mens rea for assault with a deadly weapon is culpable
criminal negligence.
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4. Prosecutorial Efficiency
Prosecutorial efficiency is a final justification for the contin-
ued existence of the felony-murder rule. 155 Like deterrence,
prosecutorial efficiency has two separate effects. First, prosecut-
ing an individual under the felony-murder rule rather than pre-
meditated murder increases the likelihood of a conviction.
56
Indeed, it is easier to obtain a conviction for felony-murder,
because the State is relieved of having to show an intent to take
the life of another.'57 The State must show the mens rea for the
underlying felony, but this is something that is easier to accom-
plish than proving premeditation and deliberation, which are two
elements required for a first-degree murder conviction. 1 5  The
removal of the State's burden of having to show premeditation and
deliberation may explain why the majority of inmates on death
row were given their sentence under felony-murder convictions as
opposed to first degree premeditated murder. 59
A second way that the felony-murder rule makes it easier to
obtain a conviction occurs during the plea bargaining process.' 6 °
When an accused is faced with a felony-murder charge, the jury
has three options: life in prison without parole; imposition of the
death penalty; or acquittal. 16 Accepting a plea agreement of sec-
ond degree murder will remove the possibility of receiving the
death penalty.' 6 2 The coercive nature of such an agreement gives
the State a tremendous bargaining chip, one frequently used
155. See Donald Baier, Arizona Felony Murder: Let the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 701, 713 (1994) (prosecutorial efficiency is "perhaps the
most compelling explanation for the resiliency of the felony murder rule.").
156. See generally William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and
Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1067 (1983).
157. Id.
158. See 2 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence at 215 (3d
Student ed. 1988).
159. See W. Gordon, Crime and Criminal Law: The California Experience
1960-1975, 13 (1981), (A compilation of FBI data on all homicides committed in
the United States in 1974). See also Marvin E. Wolfgang et al., Comparison of the
Executed and The Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 Crim. L. &
Criminology 301 (1962) (stating that 60% of all inmates on death row are there
for felony-murder convictions; of this 60%, the majority of felony-murder
convictions are for armed robbery).
160. See David Lat, Sentencing and The Fifth Amendment, 107 Yale L. J. 2673,
2678 (1998).
161. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
162. See generally State v. Brooks, 113 N.C.App. 451, 439 S.E.2d 234 (1999).
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when the evidence necessary for a first degree murder conviction
is weak. 163 For example, in Durham, North Carolina, a third indi-
vidual was charged with felony-murder for a DWI fatality approxi-
mately one year after Blackwell's conviction.'16 Rather than use
assault with a deadly weapon as the underlying felony, habitual
DWI was used to satisfy the underlying felony requirement. 65
Because the State realized that it would be difficult to obtain a
conviction for felony-murder when the underlying felony was a
strict liability offense, 166 the State offered the defendant a plea
agreement of second degree murder. 67 In fear for his life, Wilson
openly accepted the State's second degree plea agreement. 168
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF JONES AND BLA CA-WELL
On June 15, 1999, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld the conviction of Jones in a two to one decision. 169 Because
Jones and Blackwell are virtually identical it is likely that the
North Carolina Court of Appeals will also uphold the trial court's
decision in Blackwell. The decision in Jones and the possible deci-
sion in Blackwell represent an over expansion of the boundaries of
the felony-murder rule. These decisions will diminish well settled
considerations in American jurisprudence and will broaden the
scope of North Carolina's first-degree murder statute far beyond
its intended scope. If the verdicts in Jones and Blackwell are
upheld, the North Carolina Supreme Court will condone the
State's violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.
A. Jones and Blackwell: Jurisprudential Considerations
Jones and Blackwell adversely effect several concepts in
American jurisprudence. First, Jones and Blackwell decrease the
burden of proof for the State in a felony-murder trial. Second, the
163. See supra note 167.
164. State v. Wilson, 98 CR 5214, Durham County, North Carolina (Jan. 23,
1998).
165. Id.
166. A strict liability offense is one that does not require a showing of intent.
Rather, the criminal intent requirement may be satisfied by an action or actus
reas. See generally State v. Anthony, 516 S.E.2d 195 (N.C. App. 1999).
167. State v. Wilson, 98 CR 5214, Durham County, North Carolina (Jan. 23,
1998).
168. Id. at 1.
169. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 405.
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Jones and Blackwell convictions over-expand the scope of North
Carolina's felony-murder rule. Together, these concepts illustrate
why the North Carolina Supreme Court should reverse the ver-
dicts in Jones and Blackwell.
In Jones and Blackwell, the burden of proof for the underly-
ing felony was satisfied with an action or actus reas rather than a
specific intent. 17 0 This action is devoid of the requisite level of
mens rea for a crime that can result in a sentence of death. 1 7 1 In
North Carolina, the felony-murder rule has been limited to the
enumerated felonies. 172 These include felonies susceptible to the
death penalty at common law, which are arson, robbery, burglary,
rape, and kidnapping. 173 These crimes belong within the scope of
the felony-murder rule because they are crimes which require
proof of a specific intent. Jones and Blackwell intended to drink
and drive, not commit an assault. Thus, their intent was to com-
mit a traffic violation. This traffic violation was used to satisfy the
underlying felony. The underlying felony was then used to satisfy
the murder conviction; thus, the intent of the DWI motorist has
been twice removed. Twice removing the level of intent for a fel-
ony-murder conviction allows the state to prove its case by an
action. This action can satisfy the underlying mens rea, which is
culpable negligence. 174 Negligence is considerably easier for the
state to prove in a murder trial; whereas, the normal mens rea for
a first degree murder conviction requires a showing of premedita-
tion and deliberation.' 75
A second effect of Jones and Blackwell, a direct result of
decreasing the burden of proof for the state in a first-degree mur-
der trial, is that these decisions will broaden the scope of the fel-
ony-murder rule to include individuals that should never receive
the death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of
parole.' 76 In Jones, defense counsel Carroll Teeter and David
Freedman illustrated how far DWI fatalities could broaden the
scope of the felony-murder rule when they included two hypotheti-
170. See supra Section III(A).
171. See generally Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825. (Stating that "[t]he type of mens
rea of the defendant must be considered carefully in assessing the proper penalty
for felony-murder.").
172. See supra note 112 and accompanying section.
173. See supra note 145.
174. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 410.
175. State v. Hamilton, 1999 WL 799884, 7 (NC 1999).
176. Id.
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cal scenarios in Jones' motion to preclude a trial on the theory of
felony-murder. 17
7
Scenario one involves an unimpaired motorist passing in a no
passing zone which results in a collision with a multiple occupant
vehicle. 17 The resulting collision causes the death of occupant A,
while occupant B merely receives a fractured wrist. 79 Using the
State's current theory of felony-murder, derived from an assault
with a deadly weapon charge, the defendant in scenario one can
receive life in prison without parole or the death penalty.'8 0
Scenario two involves a drunk driver with a breathalyzer
reading of .40, well above North Carolina's legal limit,' 8 ' who is
driving at 100 mph on the wrong side of the road in a 35 mph
zone.' 8 2 The drunk driver collides with a single occupant vehicle
killing the occupant on impact.' 8 3 In this scenario the highest
conviction the state can obtain is second degree murder.'8
The Attorney General for the State of North Carolina, in a
reply brief to the defendant's motion to preclude a trial on a theory
of felony-murder, addressed the hypothetical scenarios presented
by Jones' counsel.' 8 1 In his brief for the State, the Attorney Gen-
eral concedes that under the law of culpable or criminal negli-
gence as applied to the felony-murder rule, the scenarios
presented could be true;8 6 but "[w]hether this or any District
Attorney would pursue an 'unimpaired' motorist passing in a no
passing zone is anyone's guess.' 8 7 First it should be noted that
the Attorney General, along with the dissent in Jones,"", agree
that an unimpaired motorist can be prosecuted under a theory of
felony-murder. Second, when someone can receive the death pen-
177. See Defendant's Brief to Preclude Trial on Felony Murder Theory, State v.
Jones, 96 CRS 34278, 34279, 36858, 36861, Dec. 16, 1996 at 5.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. In North Carolina, the legal blood alcohol limit is .08. See State v.
Crawford, 125 N.C. App. 279, 480 S.E.2d 422 (1999).
182. See Defendant's Brief to Preclude Trial on felony Murder Theory, Jones,
96 CRS at 5.
183. Id.
184. See Defendant's Brief to Preclude Trial on felony Murder Theory, Jones,
96 CRS at 5.
185. Michael Easley, State's Reply to Defendant's Brief on Felony-Murder
Theory, Dec. 17 1996 at 7.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 422.
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alty or life in prison without parole for a negligent act, one should
never guess as to who could receive such a punishment.
In the dissent of Jones, Judge Wynn used a similar scenario
to illustrate how far a DWI felony-murder conviction will broaden
the scope of North Carolina's first-degree felony-murder stat-
ute."8 9 Judge Wynn created a scenario involving the speeding
grandmother on her way to her grandchild's play.190 In this sce-
nario, the lady strikes a multiple occupant vehicle where one of
the individuals dies. 191 This lady is now susceptible to the death
penalty, whereas the extremely drunk driver who strikes a single
occupant vehicle is susceptible only to second degree murder.
192
These scenarios illustrate how the convictions of Jones and
Blackwell will expand the scope of North Carolina's felony-murder
rule. The Jones and Blackwell convictions show that in North
Carolina the drunk driver and the unimpaired motorist can be
held responsible for their actions under a theory of felony-murder.
Overly expanding North Carolina's felony-murder rule will con-
travene the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly; spe-
cifically, the General Assembly's intended scope for the felony-
murder rule. By examining the legislative history of North Caro-
lina's felony-murder rule the North Carolina Supreme Court
should reverse Jones and Blackwell as an over expansion of legis-
lative intent.
B. Jones and Blackwell: A Violation of Legislative Intent
A valid reason for reversing the holding of Jones and
Blackwell is that prosecuting a DWI fatality as first degree felony-
murder is beyond the North Carolina General Assembly's
intended scope for the rule. An examination of the history of North
Carolina's first degree felony-murder statute, specifically the stat-
utory modifications throughout this century, reveals that using
"the felony-murder rule [for traffic fatalities] was neither contem-
plated nor intended by our General Assembly."' 93
In 1977, the General Assembly of North Carolina amended
statutory felony-murder to both limit and expand the coverage of
the rule.19 4 As previously discussed in Section II(a), prior to the
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 426 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
193. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 424 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
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statutory modifications of 1977, North Carolina's felony-murder
statute encompassed a killing "committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or other fel-
ony."' 95 After 1977, the statute was modified to cover a killing
"committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any
arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony com-
mitted or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon."'196 This
modification broadened the scope of the felony-murder rule to spe-
cifically include sex offenses and kidnapping as enumerated felo-
nies.197 Simultaneously, the "any other felony" language of the
pre-1977 statute was replaced with "any felony committed or
attempted with the use of a ideadly *eapon."' 98 The statutory
modification in the language of G.S.14-17 limited what felonies
beyond those specifically listed could be used for a felony-murder
conviction. 199 The purpose of this statutory modification was to
limit the coverage of felony-murder to those committed with a
deadly weapon.2 °°
In reference to Jones and Blackwell, assault with a deadly
weapon is within the scope of "any felony committed with a deadly
weapon." However, the State's use of the felony-murder rule in
cases like Jones and Blackwell was never contemplated by the
North Carolina General Assembly.2" ' In Charlotte Housing
Authority v. Patterson, °2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals (in
addressing statutory interpretation) held that "[w]hen a literal
interpretation of the statutory language yields absurd results...
or contravenes clearly expressed legislative intent, 'the reason and
purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall
be disregarded'."20 3 Further, "the General Assembly is not pre-
sumed to intend innovations upon the common law and accord-
195. Id. See 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws Act of, Ch. 299, § 1 (1949 N.C. See. Laws).
196. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Supp. 1998).
197. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 425 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
198. See N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-17 (Supp. 1998).
199. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 425 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Charlotte Housing Authority v. Patterson, 120 N.C.App. 552, 556, 464
S.E.2d 68, 71 (1995).
203. Id. at 71. (quoting Avco Financial Services v. Isbell, 67 N.C.App. 341, 343,
312 S.E.2d 707,708 (1984))(quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 179-80,
261 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1980)).
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ingly innovations not within the Assembly's intentions shall not
be carried into effect."20 4
The purpose of the felony-murder rule "is to punish a bad per-
son for a bad act with an even greater result, meaning the death of
an individual."20 5 Whether this applies to a drunken driver is
debatable. However, the current use of the felony-murder rule
broadens its scope to include all culpably negligent drivers. 20 6 It
is well-established that a culpably negligent driver includes the
unimpaired motorist.20 7 Here, to include an unimpaired motorist
within the scope of the felony-murder rule would contravene the
legislative intent, reason and purpose of G.S.14-17.2 ° s
North Carolina case law further illustrates that the State's
use of the felony-murder rule in Jones and Blackwell was inappro-
priate. In State v. Beale,2 °9 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
was required to decide whether the "unlawful, willful and feloni-
ous killing of a viable but unborn child constituted felony-mur-
der."210 The Court held that the killing of an unborn viable fetus
was outside the General Assembly's intended scope of G.S.14-
17.211 In Beale, the Court referred to G.S. §14-44 through §14-46
in support of their opinion which specifically deal with the killing
of a viable fetus. According to the majority, when the General
Assembly enacts a statute which specifically addresses a problem,
here the killing of a viable unborn fetus, it can be assumed that
such behavior would not be included in a more ambiguous statute
such as the felony-murder rule where the action in controversy is
never mentioned.212
The reasoning of Beale can be applied to DWI fatalities, in
that the North Carolina General Assembly addressed the issue in
its codification of G.S. 20-141.4, which covers misdemeanor and
felonious death by motor vehicle. 21 '3 DWI fatalities should be
dealt with in death by motor vehicle statutes. In Beale, the court
204. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 425 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (citing Buck v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 265 N.C. 285, 290, 144 S.E.2d 34, 37 (1965).
205. State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 66-67, 462 S.E.2d 492, 498 (1995).
206. Michael Easley, State's Reply to Defendant's Brief on Felony-Murder
Theory, Dec. 17 1996 at 7.
207. Id.
208. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 425 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
209. 324 N.C. 87, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).
210. Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 1.
211. Id. at 4.
212. Id.
213. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.4 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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even used death by motor vehicle as an example of what crimes
would be outside the scope of first degree felony-murder.2 14
The creation and expansion of criminal offenses is the prerogative
of the legislative branch of the government. The legislature has
considered the question of intentionally destroying a fetus and
determined the punishment thereof.... It has adopted legislation
dealing generally with the crimes of abortion and kindred
offenses.... It has also created new offenses of felony and misde-
meanor death by vehicle .... It has amended N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 14-
44 and N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 14-17 on more than one occasion. Nothing
in the statues or amendments shows a clear legislative intent to
change the common law [felony-murder].215
The North Carolina General Assembly has specifically codi-
fied the occurrence of DWI fatalities under vehicular homicide.
Therefore, there is no reason to include such activities within the
felony-murder rule, especially when such measures would unduly
broaden the scope of North Carolina's most severe crime, a crime
which may result in the imposition of the death penalty.
C. Jones and Blackwell: A Violation of the United States
Constitution
The appellate decision in Jones and the likely decision in
Blackwell should be overturned by the North Carolina Supreme
Court for violating the United States Constitution. The use of the
felony-murder rule in DWI fatalities violates both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Eighth Amendment. As such, if Jones and
Blackwell are upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court, their
convictions will represent an undermining of the United States
Constitution.
1. Ex Post Facto: A Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
The application of the felony-murder rule in Jones and
Blackwell operates as an ex post facto law in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.216 As raised by
Jones, the State of North Carolina failed to provide him with fair
notice that his conduct would subject him to first-degree felony-
murder.217 It is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution if an
214. Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 1.
215. Id.
216. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 419 (Wynn, J., dissent).
217. Id.
[Vol. 22:169
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss1/6
DWI/IFELONY-MURDER
individual becomes susceptible to a criminal law without adequate
notice that his behavior is in violation of the statute.218
The prohibition against ex post facto laws can be found in
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.2 19 As
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, there are four
basic categories where a law will be considered an ex post facto
violation of the United States Constitution:220 (1) making an
action criminal which was done before the passing of a law and
which was innocent when done;221 (2) aggravating a crime or mak-
ing the punishment greater than when it was committed;222 (3)
allowing the imposition of a different or greater punishment than
was permitted when the crime was committed; 223 and (4) altering
the legal rules of evidence to permit different or less testimony to
convict the offender than was required at the time the offense was
committed.224
Historically, the four ex post facto categories have been
directed at legislative action. However, the United States
Supreme Court has also extended the ex post facto clause to
include judicial enactments.225 In Bouie v. City of Columbia,226
the Supreme Court held that "[a]n unforeseeable judicial enlarge-
ment of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates pre-
cisely like an 'ex post facto law'."227 Therefore, the United States
218. Id. (As clarified by the Judge Wynn in his dissent, the defendant does not
argue that he did not have fair notice that his conduct was subject to murder in
general because North Carolina has long prosecuted individuals for DWI
fatalities as second degree murder. Jones' specifically argues that he was not
given fair notice that he was subject to a conviction of first degree murder for his
conduct.).
219. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977).
220. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 420 (Wynn, J., dissent).
221. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990); See Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386, 390 (1798); See State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613, 620, 403 S.E.2d 495, 500
(1991).
222. See Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 42.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964) ("If a state
legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause
from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.").
226. Id.
227. Id. at 353. Even were it not stated by the United States Supreme Court,
to bar judicial enlargements like legislative enactments would make complete
sense because the bulk of ex post facto claims are derived judicially rather than
legislatively.
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Supreme Court has stated that it is unconstitutional to have "judi-
cially enforced changes in legal interpretations which
unforeseeably expand the punishment accompanying a conviction
beyond that which an actor could have anticipated at the time he
committed the criminal act."22
8
To raise a valid ex post facto claim; specifically, judicially
enforced changes, the interpretation of the law must satisfy two
requirements. First, the law in question must be applied retro-
spectively.229 A retrospective application of a law is one that has
been applied to events that occurred prior to the enactment of the
law in question.23 ° Second, the law in question must have disad-
vantaged the person who has.raised the claim.231 For the Jones
appeal, the initial requirements were satisfied.
In Jones, the central question regarding a judicial ex post
facto application involves the issue of fair notice.232 Simply put,
"if an actor does not have fair notice that his conduct is proscribed
by a statute or a judicial construction of a statute, then the actor
may raise a Due Process claim that a later judicial construction
operated like a quasi ex post facto law."233 Once an ex post facto
issue has been raised, for the law to survive judicial review three
requirements must be met. The first requirement involves the
vagueness doctrine, which bars the enforcement of a "statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application."234 The second
requirement involves the canon of strict construction of criminal
statutes which "ensures fair notice by resolving ambiguity in a
criminal statute as to apply only to conduct clearly covered."235
Lastly, "Due Process bars courts from applying a novel construc-
tion of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor
228. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-354.
229. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
230. As an example, an individual is arrested for driving under the influence
because his blood alcohol level is .03. After this individual has been arrested, the
North Carolina Legislature lowers the blood alcohol level necessary for a
conviction for driving under the influence to .03 (currently the legal limit is .08).
Here if the legislative action is applied to the defendant it would be an ex post
facto violation of the United States Constitution.
231. Graham, 450 U.S. at 29.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
235. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
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any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed . . . [as] within its
scope." '236 All three requirements must be satisfied for any judi-
cial or legislative law to satisfy a fair notice claim. In Jones, the
majority held that each of the fair notice requirements were
met.237 However, a close examination will show that the majority
improperly came to this conclusion.
The majority in Jones held that Jones' ex post facto claim was
without merit for two reasons. 238  First, the Court determined
that according to North Carolina case law, the State's use of sec-
ond degree murder for DWI prosecutions provided Jones with ade-
quate notice. Second, the Court held that Jones received adequate
notice because he had received many DWI's in his lifetime.239
Both reasons given by the majority are misguided.
With regards to the first reason, that North Carolina's second
degree murder convictions constitute fair notice, the majority has
considered all categories of murder as the same. Jones was very
specific in his claim that he was not given fair notice. Jones stated
that he was not given the appropriate notice for first degree mur-
der, not murder as an entire category. 240 The majority ignored
Jones' distinction and "conclude[d] that Jones received constitu-
tionally adequate notice that a culpably negligent driver in North
Carolina could be subjected to the death penalty."24 1 Indeed, a
reasonable person is provided with adequate notice that he is sub-
ject to a conviction of second degree murder for a DWI fatality, 24 2
but this does not satisfy the constitutional requirements of fair
notice. Under North Carolina's second degree murder statute, a
defendant cannot receive the death penalty if convicted. The
death penalty is strictly limited to first degree murder. When a
defendant is now susceptible to the death penalty under the fel-
ony-murder rule, yet nobody in the history of North Carolina or
236. Id.
237. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 1.
238. Id. at 418.
239. Id. at 411.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.4
(1995); State v. Rich, 512 S.E.2d 441 (1999) (affirming a second degree murder
conviction for a driver who was speeding and veered out of his lane of travel);
State v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 317 S.E.2d 394 (1984) (affirming a second-degree
murder in facts substantially similar to those in the case sub judice).
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the United States as a whole has ever received such punishment
for a DWI fatality,243 fair notice has not been satisfied.
The second reason for the dismissal of Jones' Fourteenth
Amendment claim involves his prior DWI convictions. 244 The
Court of Appeals in Jones paid special attention to the large
number of Jones' previous DWI convictions. In the majority opin-
ion, it was determined that a first degree felony-murder conviction
fell within the range of punishments expected, especially because
Jones had received so many prior DWI's.245 Stating that a past
conviction for a DWI is fair notice that an individual is subject to
the death penalty is improper. It is undisputed that Jones took
serious risks by drinking and driving and naturally, such risks
subjected Jones to serious consequences. However, serious conse-
quences should not include any and all punishments available in
the penal system, such as the death penalty. Arguably, only the
District Attorney would have imagined that a DWI was within the
scope of the felony-murder rule where the punishment could be
the death penalty. Thus, having no recognition of the possible
punishment for a DWI fatality is a legitimate claim.
It is possible that the majority avoided a proper examination
of this case by looking only at the conviction and sentence as
applied to a DWI fatality. In Jones, the charge of DWI was not
part of the crime of felony-murder, nor was the underlying charge
of assault.246 In fact, the underlying assault was satisfied by cul-
pable or criminal negligence. Therefore, the speeding grand-
mother, as presented by Judge Wynn in his dissent, is also subject
to North Carolina's first degree felony-murder rule. After Jones, a
driver can be culpably negligent even when he is sober.247
Although Jones' "conduct is more egregious than the speeding
driver, the egregiousness of that conduct did not provide the
defendant with any more notice [that he was subject to the felony-
murder rule] ... than the person who drives over the speed limit
who seriously injures one person and kills another."248 After
Jones, the negligent motorist is now susceptible to North Caro-
lina's first degree murder statute without adequate notice.
243. See infra note 293.
244. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 411.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 420. (The underlying felony was assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury, not felonious driving while impaired.).
247. Id. at 421.
248. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 421 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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2. The Possibility of the Death Penalty: A Violation of the
Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
declares: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."249 It "pro-
hibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed."25 ° In Jones, an Eighth
Amendment issue was never raised and it is unknown whether
this issue will be raised in Blackwell. Two Supreme Court cases,
Enmund v. Florida,25 1 and Solem v. Helm, 25 2 can be contrasted
with Jones and Blackwell to illustrate that Jones' and Blackwell's
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment for being cruel and
unusual.
In Enmund, the defendant was convicted of first degree mur-
der and robbery as the driver of a getaway car used during the
killing of an elderly couple.253 Enmund participated in neither
the robbery nor killing of the couple, yet he received a sentence of
death.254 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld
Enmund's death sentence. 255 However, in a plurality decision, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida decision.2 56
The majority opinion written by Justice White held that
Enmund's sentence must be reversed for two significant rea-
sons. 257 First, to give a non-triggerman the death penalty served
no penalogical purpose.258 Second, retribution could not be satis-
fied by giving Enmund the death penalty.2 59 When addressing the
purposes of the United States penal system, Justice White focused
249. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
250. Id. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910), (quoting
O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1892)).
251. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). See State v. McNeill, 350 N.C. 657, 518 S.E.2d 486
(N.C. 1999) (following Enmund).
252. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
253. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782.
254. Id. at 798.
255. Id. at 786. Under Florida law, Enmund's actions were enough to make
him an aider and abettor to the death of the elderly couple. An aider and abettor
to felony-murder made Enmund a principal and as a principal to felony-murder,
Enmund was subject to the death penalty. Id.
256. Id. at 782. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion and Justice
O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger, Powell and
Rehnquist joined.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 799.
259. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
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on the deterrence rationale as it applies to the felony-murder
rule.260 He stated "if a person does not intend that [a] life be
taken..., the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed
... will not 'enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision
to act'."26' Because Enmund was a non-triggerman, actually the
driver of the getaway car, at no time could Enmund have calcu-
lated the death of the victims.
A second reason given by Justice White involves retribution.
Justice White stated that "it is fundamental that 'causing harm
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the
same harm unintentionally'. "262 "American criminal law has long
considered a defendant's intention . .. and therefore his moral
guilt... to be critical to the degree of criminal culpability, and the
court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally exces-
sive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing."263 As Enmund did
not intend the death of the victims, the Court stated that to give
him the death penalty in the absence of any mens rea, would vio-
late the Eighth Amendment.2 64 Indeed, Enmund "had no inten-
tion of committing or causing [the victim's death; therefore,] the
[death penalty] does not measurably contribute to the retributive
end of ensuring that the criminal get his just desserts."265
Like Enmund, it would be wrong to subject Jones or
Blackwell to the possibility of the death penalty for a murder con-
viction. Deterrence is not satisfied by the imposition of the death
penalty on a drunk driver. Alcoholics, like any other addict, will
not be deterred by the possibility of the death penalty.266 Further,
260. Id. at 799.
261. Id. (quoting in part from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
262. Id. at 798.
263. Id. at 800 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698, (1975)). The
court also cited Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (punishing
narcotics addiction is a violation of the 8 ' Amendment) and Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 363 (1910) (the Court invalidated a statute making public
official's false entry into public record a crime absent injury or intent to injure).
264. Id. at 801.
265. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
266. See Brandon K. Applegate, "Public Support for Drunk Driving
Countermeasures: Social Policy for Saving Lives", Crime and Delinquency, (April
1995) ("The relative ineffectiveness of existing deterrence-based counter-
measures to fight drunk driving has prompted calls to consider alternative
strategies based in a broader understanding of the roots of drinking and driving.
In particular, commentators have suggested that drunk driving best be
conceptualized not as a criminal justice problem but as a social problem. From a
social problem's perspective, drunk driving and the annual toll it exacts are seen
[Vol. 22:169202
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Jones and Blackwell are being punished for an unintentional act.
Clearly, one cannot deter an unintentional act.
Having no justifiable retributive reason for the strength of the
sentence imposed was the second reason for the reversal of
Enmund267 and this reason also applies to Jones and Blackwell.
The greater an individual's intent, the more severe the punish-
ment should be in terms of retribution.2 6 Neither the drunk
driver nor the unimpaired motorist intends the death of another.
However, the felony-murder rule is codified as first degree murder
in North Carolina. 269 First degree murder usually requires pre-
meditation and deliberation.27 ° Arguably, an individual guilty of
premeditated murder deserves life in prison without parole or the
death penalty under a theory of retribution. As a result of Jones
and Blackwell, someone guilty of DWI felony-murder will receive
the same level of punishment for a traffic accident. Retribution in
this case is not a justifiable reason for increasing the level of pun-
ishment to such a high degree.
The debate over the existence of the felony-murder rule
through the use of justifications like retribution and deterrence
has resulted in no clear cut test for determining the constitution-
ality of a criminal punishment. Such unsure results for Jones and
Blackwell should be clarified by the examination of a second
United States Supreme Court verdict regarding the Eighth
Amendment.
as the inevitable result of the intersection of American social institutions:
transportation and recreation. This institutional approach refers to how the
challenging paradigm leads to important policy implications. First, unlike the
criminal justice approach, the main emphasis should not be on catching and
punishing (or even reforming) drunk drivers. Instead, the focus should be on
altering institutional patterns, especially those that foster the intersection of
automobile use and alcohol consumption. Second, drunk driving is seen as a
public health issue; and as with other health problems, the goal should be to
devise policies that save lives and reduce injuries. Criminal justice sanctions can
be applied only to the culpable (even if general deterrence is hoped for) and often
are applied only after substantial harm has occurred. Lifesaving
countermeasures, however, can be implemented across the population and are
concerned with prevention.").
267. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
268. See Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 698. ("From the beginning of American history,
this country has intended to punish according to one's intent.")
269. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
270. Id.
1999] 203
35
Stiles: North Carolina's Unconstitutional Expansion of an Ancient Maxim:
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Solem v. Helm271 is also useful in an Eighth Amendment
analysis of Jones and Blackwell. In Helm, the defendant was con-
victed in a South Dakota state court for using a "no account" check
for $100.272 The maximum punishment for this crime was five
years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.273 However, the defendant
was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole
because he qualified for South Dakota's recidivist statute.2 74
Helm had received six prior felony convictions 275 and as a recidi-
vist, was mandatorily sentenced to life in prison without parole.276
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed Helm's
life sentence.277
In 1981, Helm sought relief in United States District
Court .2 7  The District Court denied review, even though it consid-
ered Helm's punishment harsh.27 9 The Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court directing them to grant review, because Helm's
sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense." 28 0 In 1983, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that the conviction of Helm was a violation of
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.28 '
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, established a three
prong test to determine whether a defendant's sentence was a vio-
lation of the United States Constitution.28 2 First, the gravity of
the offense should be weighed against the harshness of the pen-
alty.28 3 Second, the defendant's sentence should be compared to
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction.
That is, whether "more serious crimes are subject to the same pen-
alty, or, to less serious penalties."28 4 Finally, the defendant's sen-
tence should be compared to sentences imposed for the
271. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
272. Id. at 281.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 279-280 (Helm had received three convictions for third-degree
burglary, a conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny,
and a conviction for driving while intoxicated).
276. Id. at 281.
277. Helm, 463 U.S. at 283.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See Solem v. Helm, 684 F.2d 582, 587 (8' Cir. 1982).
281. Helm, 463 U.S. 277.
282. Id. at 291.
283. Id.
284. Id.
204 [Vol. 22:169
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commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.2 s5 Powell
applied this analytical framework to Helm and held that:
[Helm] received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor
criminal conduct ... [Helm] was treated more harshly than other
criminals in the State who had committed more serious crimes.
He ha[d] been treated more harshly than he would have been in
any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single state.
[Therefore], his sentence [was] significantly disproportionate to
his crime, and [was] prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.28 6
Applying Helm to Jones and Blackwell, it is clear that the
Jones and Blackwell verdicts should be reversed. First, while it is
true that Jones and Blackwell's offenses are worse than that of
Helm, their sentences are still disproportionate in relation to their
acts. Both convictions are based on criminal negligence, not an
intentional act. Negligent conduct is less serious than intentional
conduct and should be treated accordingly for sentencing pur-
poses. 28 7 Further, felony-murder now applies to the speeding
motorist as well as the drunk driver.28 8 When someone is killed in
a traffic accident it is truly tragic. However, it is Draconian 28 9 to
think that such an unimpaired speeding motorist deserves life in
prison without parole or the death penalty just because someone
has been killed. It is equally Draconian to sentence an impaired
motorist to life in prison without parole.
Second, a comparison of the conduct of Jones and Blackwell to
other punishments in North Carolina shows that their punish-
ments fail the Helm test. The actions of Jones and Blackwell are
subject to the same sentence as the actions of a serial killer con-
victed of first degree murder.290 Further, a defendant convicted of
second degree murder, which requires a greater showing of mens
rea2 91 than that of assault,292 can receive a sentence as low as ten
285. Id.
286. Id. at 303.
287. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698, (1975).
288. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 422.
289. See Blacks Law Dictionary at 1001 (West Publishing 1998) (A code of laws
prepared by Draco, the celebrated lawgiver of Athens. These laws were
exceedingly severe, and the term is now sometimes applied to any laws of
unusual harshness.).
290. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1998) (Where premeditated
murder and felony-murder are codified as equals under North Carolina's first-
degree murder statute.).
291. Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 413. In North Carolina second degree murder
requires a showing of malice.
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years. This crime, while greater in statutory intent as well as
moral culpability, is punished less severely than Jones or
Blackwell.
Finally, Jones' and Blackwell's sentences violate the third
prong of the Helm test. To date, with the exception of North Caro-
lina, no state in this country has given an individual responsible
for a DWI fatality, a conviction under first degree felony-murder
with a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole.293 No other state has attempted a felony-murder convic-
292. Id. at 409. Felony-murder has no mens rea. It borrows the mens rea from
the underlying felony. Here criminal negligence is the mens rea required for a
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.
293. The following cases are an example of how severe other states will punish
an individual guilty of a DWI traffic fatality. Fillmore v. State , 668 So.2d 141
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (Defendant was convicted of homicide by motor vehicle
and received a sentence of five years in prison.); Lanni v. State, 1999 WL 73745
(Alaska App. 1999) (Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to
five years in prison); State v. Jansing, 918 P.2d 1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)
(Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and received a sentence of 15 years in
prison.); Walker v. State, 1999 WL 407477 (Ark. App. 1999) (Defendant was
convicted of manslaughter and given a sentence of 10 years); People v. Gallardo,
27 Cal. Rptr.2d 502 (Cal. App. 1994) (Defendant was convicted of gross vehicular
manslaughter and received a sentence of six years.); People v. Lucero, 1999 WL
304377 (Colo. App. 1999) (Defendant was convicted of three counts of vehicular
homicide and received a sentence of nine years.); State v. Lonergan, 548 A.2d 718
(Conn. App. 1989 ) (The defendant was acquitted of second-degree manslaughter
with motor vehicle while intoxicated which carries a lesser sentence than first
degree felony-murder.); Moorehead v. State, 638 A.2d 52 (Del. Supr. 1994)
(Moorehead was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to 12 years
in prison); Euceda v. State, 711 So.2d 122 (Fla. App. 1993) (Euceda was convicted
of driving under the influence manslaughter which carries a lower sentence than
first degree felony-murder); Smith v. State, 475 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. App. 1996)
(Defendant was convicted of homicide by vehicle also carrying a substantially
lower sentence than that of Blackwell or Jones); State v. Lowe, 815 P.2d 450
(Idaho 1998) (Defendant plead guilty to aggravated DUI and vehicular
manslaughter and received a sentence of two years); People v. Martin, 640
N.E.2d 638 (Ill. App. 1994) (Defendant was sentenced to 14 years for each
reckless homicide conviction); State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867 (Iowa 1992)
(Defendant was found guilty on two counts of vehicular homicide and sentenced
to two five year terms of imprisonment); State v. Wright, 948 P.2d 677, 679 (Kan.
App. 1993) (Wright was sentenced to 120 months for an involuntary
manslaughter conviction); State v. Bradford, 700 So.2d 1046 (La. App. 1997)
(Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide and received a 15 year sentence);
State v. Constantine, 588 A.2d 294 (Me. 1991) (Defendant was sentenced to ten
years imprisonment for vehicular manslaughter); Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291
(Md. 1994) (The court imposed concurrent five year sentences for each count of
manslaughter); Morris v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles for the State of
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Massachusetts, 1994 WL 879838 (Mass. Supr. 1994) (Defendant was previously
convicted of motor vehicle homicide where he received 3 years probation.); People
v. Lardie, 551 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. 1996) (The defendant was subject to 15 years
imprisonment for the charge of causing death by operating a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor); State v. Condon, 497 N.W.2d 272 (Minn.
App. 1993) (Defendant convicted of criminal vehicular operation and received a
sentence of five years); State v. Pogue, 851 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. App. 1993)
(Defendant was convicted for involuntary manslaughter and given a three year
sentence.); Frambles v. State, 1999 WL 228864 (Miss. App. 1999) (Defendant was
convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol causing death and
sentenced to a term of 15 years in prison); State v. Gould, 704 P.2d 20, 23 (Mont.
1985) (Gould was found guilty of negligent homicide and sentenced to three years
imprisonment); State v. Harrison, 588 N.W.2d 556 (Neb. 1999) (Defendant was
convicted of two counts of motor vehicle homicide and sentenced to consecutive
terms of five years probation which was not considered too lenient on appeal);
Abitre v. State, 738 P.2d 1307 (Nev. 1987) (Defendant was convicted of causing
the death of another while driving a vehicle while intoxicated and was sentenced
to considerably less than a first degree felony-murder conviction); State v.
Ebinger, 603 A.2d 924 (N.H. 1992) (Defendant was sentenced to three and half
years in prison); State v. Saccone, 72 A.2d 923 (N.J. 1950) (Defendant was
sentenced to a non-custodial probationary term for committing third-degree
death by auto.); State v. Guerro, 974 P.2d 669 (N.M. App. 1999) (Defendant was
sentenced to 15 years in prison for five counts of homicide by vehicle.); People v.
MacDonald, 675 N.E.2d 1219 (N.Y. 1996) (Defendant pled guilty to negligent
homicide in which alcohol was involved and received five years in prison); State
v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 317 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 1984) (Defendant was convicted of
second degree murder for a DWI fatality and received a of considerably less than
life in prison without the possibility of parole.); State v. Shirk, 1999 WL 503419
(Ohio App. 1999) (Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison for an
involuntary manslaughter conviction); Baker v. State, 966 P.2d 797 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1998) (Defendant was convicted of second degree felony murder and
sentenced to thirty years in prison.); State v. Boone, 661 P.2d 917 (Or. 1983)
(Defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree and sentenced to a term
of imprisonment considerably less than a life in prison without parole); State v.
Petroll, publication pages are unavailable, (Pa. 1998) (Defendant received a
sentence of nine years for three counts of vehicular homicide.); State v. Mattatall,
603 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 1992) (Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.); State v. White, 428 S.E.2d 740 (S.C. App.
1993) (The defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence and
received a sentence of 21 years); State v. Big Head, 363 N.W.2d 556 (S.D. 1985)
(Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide where six-year prison sentence,
with credit given for time served, was not cruel and inhuman punishment.);
State v. Hart, 1999 WL 450221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (The defendant was
convicted by a jury of criminally negligent homicide. He was sentenced for the
criminally negligent homicide conviction as a Range I, standard offender to two
years confinement in the Department of Correction.); State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d
1226 (Utah 1979) (Defendant was convicted of automobile homicide which carries
a considerably lower sentence than first degree felony-murder.); State v. Welch,
376 A.2d 351 (Vt. 1977) (Defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated,
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tion for a DWI fatality because unintentional acts should never be
susceptible to the death penalty.
Together, Enmund and Helm illustrate why North Carolina's
use of the felony-murder rule for a DWI fatality is misguided.
Enmund shows that deterrence and retribution are invalid rea-
sons for using the felony-murder rule in DWI cases. Further, all
three prongs of the Helm test are violated by convicting Jones and
Blackwell under a theory of first degree felony-murder with a pun-
ishment of life without parole. Thus, these United States Supreme
Court cases further illustrate why the verdicts in Jones and
Blackwell should be overturned on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Jones and Blackwell are two individuals who have received
several DWI convictions and should be punished for their actions,
specifically for the deaths of three innocent people. It should be
stressed that this article does not assert that either defendant
should not be placed in prison. However, the proper sentence is
second degree murder which is permissible under the United
States Constitution and not first degree felony-murder.294 Fur-
ther, it would be entirely appropriate for both individuals to
receive a lengthy prison sentence under North Carolina's second
degree murder statute.2 95
What this Comment does argue is that DWI fatalities should
not be prosecuted under North Carolina's felony-murder statute.
death resulting which also carries a lower sentence than felony-murder.); State
v. Davis, 1999 WL 438909 (Wash. App. 1999) (Davis pleaded guilty to two counts
of vehicular homicide by driving in a reckless manner with a standard range
sentence of 36 to 48 months.); State v. Knuckles, 473 S.E.2d 131(W. Va. 1996)
(Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of three counts of vehicular
homicide arising out of the alcohol-related deaths of three victims. The trial court
sentenced the defendant to three consecutive terms of one-to-ten years in
prison.); State v. Cooper , 344 N.W.2d 194 (Wis. App. 1983) (Defendant was
properly convicted on two counts of homicide by negligent use of vehicle, and
each count on which she was convicted carried maximum penalty of two years of
imprisonment.); State v. Appellee, 922 P.2d 846 (Wyo. 1996) (Term of 18 to 20
years for offense of aggravated vehicular homicide was not abuse of discretion.).
294. State v. Rich, 512 S.E.2d 441 (1999) (affirming a second degree murder
conviction for a driver who was speeding and veered out of his lane of travel);
State v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 317 S.E.2d 394 (1984) (affirming a second-degree
murder in facts substantially similar to those in the case sub judice).
295. See Liz Marie Marciniak, The Use of Day Reporting as an Intermediate
Sanction: A Study of Offender Targeting and Program Termination, Prison
Journal, (Sage Publications, Vol. 79) (June 1, 1999).
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Enmund and Helm illustrate that it is unconstitutional to use
G.S.14-17 to convict someone responsible for a traffic fatality of
felony-murder and that such convictions are also beyond the Gen-
eral Assembly's intended scope for this statute. The felony-mur-
der rule is not without criticism; however it has served a useful
purpose in the United States. Prosecuting a DWI fatality under a
theory of felony-murder will diminish the validity of this rule.296
Drunk driving fatalities, often caused by alcoholism, can be
changed through proper education. For those who are beyond
education, their punishment should be reasonable.2 97 When pun-
ishing an individual also results in the misuse of a law which has
been a useful prosecutorial tool in North Carolina, then the pun-
ishment is unreasonable. Therefore, the verdicts in Jones and
Blackwell should be reversed and the defendants should be
retried under a proper criminal statute, such as death by motor
vehicle or in the most severe situations, like Jones and Blackwell,
under North Carolina's second degree murder statute.
Graham T. Stiles
296. See generally Donald Baier, Arizona Felony Murder: Let the Punishment
Fit the Crime, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 701, 713 (1994)
297. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698, (1975).
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